COMMENTS
ADMINISTRATION OF THE AFFIRMATIVE TRAP
AND THE DOCTRINE OF ENTRAPMENT:
DEVICE AND DEFENSE t
The affirmative trap-police solicitation to commit crimeis a widely used detection device in the enforcement of sumptuary criminal laws, particularly those dealing with narcotics. In
response to abuse of the device, Illinois courts, and recently the
Illinois legislature, have recognized the defense of entrapment.
An examination of the decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court
reveals that the scope of the defense in Illinois is narrow. Administrative practices of the Narcotics Section of the Chicago
Police Department show that the principal police decision that
is made in the administrationof the device of the affirmative
trap is not what inducements to offer, but whether to lay the
affirmative trap at all. Field research into the administrative
practices of the Cook County State's Attorney's Office reveal
marked official insensitivity to the defense. On the basis of an
analysis of the interaction of appellate doctrine and administrative practices the author makes recommendations to increase
police safeguards in the use of the device and prosecutor sensitivity to the defense. New standardsfor the scope of the defense are proposed for legislative action.
The affirmative trap' is used primarily in the enforcement of sumptuary
legislation proscribing behavior directed against the general welfare
rather than against any particular individual.2 Violation of these laws
t David P. Bancroft, J.D. the University of Chicago, 1963; General Legal Assistant,
United States Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Organized Crime and Racketeering Section. An earlier draft of this paper was prepared for Visiting Professor
Harold S. Solomon's Seminar on Public Prosecution given in the winter and spring
quarters of the academic year 1962-63. The author is indebted to members of the
Narcotics Section of the Chicago Police Department and the State's Attorney's Office
of Cook County for their patience and cooperation in freely giving of their time and
energy. The views expressed in this comment are entirely those of the author.
1 There is no generally applied neutral term to describe the device. A neutral
term used by police officials to describe official solicitation of narcotics sales offenses is
the "controlled" or "supervised" "buy" or "purchase." Compare the term "encouragement" used in Rotenberg, The Police Detection Practice of Encouragement, 49 VA. L.
Rxv. 871 (1963). The phrase "affirmative trap," or more simply, "trap" is used throughout to describe the device.
2 Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent
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involves willing participants performing consensual acts, the "victims"
enjoying themselves. 3 Since a large portion of the citizenry condones
such behavior as falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the individual's private discretion, and others wish to avoid the social stigma
or status degradation which would reflect upon them were they to accuse
those close to them, law enforcement is rarely afforded the advantage of
a complaining victim or witness. 4 Finally, these offenses are committed
with at least the customary secrecy attendant most other criminal behavior.5
Despite the fact that violation of sumptuary laws is not thought by
the "victim," those dose to him or a large portion of the citizenry to
wring a deprivation for which a claim for restoration by the criminal
process should be made, it is undeniable that such laws are popular laws.
They are popular with the police because among other factors they lead
them into areas where the incidence of crime generally is believed to
Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091, 1093 (1957). Such sumptuary legislation is made up
for the most part of laws dealing with sexual offenses, liquor, narcotics, gambling and
abortion.
3 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10, comment 2 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). Doubts
about including "willing victim" conduct within the scope of the criminal law
have been ably expressed in Allen, The Borderline of the Criminal Law: Problems of
"Socializing" Criminal Justice, 32 Soc. SERvxcE REV. 107 (1958).
4 In an address before the New York County Grand Jury Association in 1947, the
District Attorney for New York County, New York, Frank S. Hogan said: "We appear
to have developed a public morality which condemns-rather than praises-any private
citizen who seeks to enforce the laws that we-as members of a free society-have
called into being." Quoted in HARNEY & CRoss, THE INFORMER IN LAW ENFORCEMENT
6-7 (1960). See also People v. Outten, 13 Ill. 2d 21, 24, 147 N.E.2d 284, 286 (1958):
"Resort to such practices [the affirmative trap] to enforce the law and punish its violation becomes necessary 'in view of the well-known facts that criminals usually work
in secrecy and that some unlawful practices are encouraged and protected by a large
class of citizens.'" Recent efforts in New York to combat the "reluctance to tell"
problem have centered on Mayor Wagner's "Box 100" program. N.Y. Times, Aug. 20,
1963, p. 24, col. 2: "Complaints sent by citizens to Mayor Wagner's Box 100, New York
8, have resulted in more than 5,000 arrests by the police since the box was set up in
January, 1961. This figure was announced yesterday by the Mayor, who said the
arrests were for a variety of major offenses, including narcotics, prostitution and
gambling." The identity of a citizen who sends a complaint to "Box 100" is protected.
5 Although these offenses characteristically involve a "course of dealing," they are
difficult to spot by standard patrol techniques for that very reason. They are in many
respects indistinguishable from legitimate transactions. Their commission is usually
swift and surrounded by precautionary measures initially motivated by distrust of the
"regular customers" but which also operate against detection by the police. For example, it was reported by the Chicago Narcotics Section that street pushers sometimes
secrete narcotics in the body crevices to avoid the possibility of a "big loss" if they
are "rolled," and this insurance means that delivery -must be made in an interior or
comparatively private location difficult to detect by standard patrol techniques. See
People v. McSmith, 23 Ill. 2d 87, 92-94, 178 N.E.2d 641, 643-45 (1961); People v. Strong,
21 Ill. 2d 320, 325, 172 N.E.2d 765, 766 (1961); People v. Outten, 13 Ill. 2d 21, 22-23,
147 N.E.2d 284, 286 (1958).
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be high, the detection work is interesting, invariably involving "secret"
efforts in elite police units, and the substantive nature of the offenses
is endowed with a certain morbid flavor. They are popular with the
prosecutor because the cases are routine, provide a good training ground
for the younger state's attorneys, and are unlikely to compel any compromises with private ambitions. They are popular with juries7 because
of their notions about the nature and consequences of the crimes, 8 and
may even be popular with judges because they are enforced primarily
against those who characteristically exert little political influence. 9
Because a demand is made against the criminal process to enforce laws
6 Police perception of the addict crime problem differs from this general belief. See
page 158 infra. Compare note 79 infra.
7 The available statistics on the matter, taken from PETERSON, A REPORT ON CHICAGO
CRIME 28 (1961); id. at 18 (1962); id. at 9 (1963), are revealing:
JURY TRIALS OF NARCOTICS CASES

1960
1961
1962

No. of Cases

Guilty

Not Guilty

21
17
18

20
12
17

1
5
1

The increase in "not guilty" verdicts has an interesting background. The Cook County
State's Attorney's office explained that due in large part to the success achieved in the
prosecution of narcotics cases in 1960 the office instituted a policy of "full prosecution"
(maximum charging) against narcotics offenders. The plan backfired. Since the trial
judges were reluctant to invoke the high minimum penalties provided by statute they
directed several not guilty verdicts in the face of prosecutor refusal to reduce the
charge..
8 The culpability of the narcotics offender is said to be based on a number of notions: "Narcotics ravage the human body." "Narcotics destroy morality." "Narcotic
addicts are a sexual menace." "Drug use makes a weak, ineffective member of society."
"Narcotic addicts are criminals." "Addiction is contagious." "Once an addict always
an addict." ELDRIDGE, NARCOTICS AND THE LAw 13-34 (1962). The author calls these
notions into question. See also Solomon, Book Review, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 794 (1963).
The definite strain of "middle class morality" that often shows up in jury deliberations
has not gone unnoticed by defense counsel: "[If I had to make a generalization about
a single kind of person I think a defense lawyer ought to avoid as a juror, I would
say stay away from the personality representing petty respectability. The 'top
sergeants,' or noncommissioned officers of big business; the foreman at the gas company; the teller at the bank; the floor-walker at the big department store. They are
all unduly responsive to the pressures of 'respectability' in the community, and they
are rarely very likely to listen to a defense with any great sympathy." Steinberg &
Paulsen, A Conversation with Defense Counsel on Problems of a Criminal Defense, 7
Prac. Law., May 1961, pp. 25, 26.
9 A Cook County State's Attorney pointed out an example. He cited a case in which
the government informer supplied the narcotics purchased from the defendant. The
trial judge who was, according to the prosecutor, ardently seeking election, imposed a
severe sentence. The prosecutor had recommended the minimum ten years.
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whose breach rarely affords the police complaining victims or witnesses
a tension is created: A claim is made on enforcement agencies which
cannot be satisfied by standard police techniques. In order to successfully apprehend violators the police need to be present at the time and
place the crime is committed. But omnipresence is not a realistic expectation. Behavior offensive to such legislation is likely to be widely
dispersed. Time and personnel limitations, largely functions of budgetary
considerations, call for selective enforcement in the form of spot control.' 0
It is to resolve this tension between the demand for enforcement of
sumptuary legislation and the difficulties in securing notice and evidence
of willing "victim" crimes that the device of the affirmative trap is used.
Characteristically an informer-purchaser and a police undercover agent
approach a suspect with an offer to purchase an illegal commodity. Insofar as the device is sanctioned by the courts, it is an exceptional one.
Official solicitation and participation in the criminal act is condoned.
In every case the defendant could not have committed the particular
act for which he is tried without the opportunity and facilities furnished
by law enforcement officials. Such an enforcement procedure can only
be justified on the questionable assumption, inimical to the aim of
deterrence, that affirmative conduct on the part of the state in encouraging
a particular offense that otherwise would not have been committed is
necessary to incarcerate those who, because they once committed crime
with police solicitation, have committed or will commit similar crimes
that escape police detection.
As the affirmative trap is used to overcome difficulties in the detection
of secret criminal acts and apprehension of their willing "victims," it is
companion to two other police devices used to similar ends: surveillance
and harassment.
Police surveillance involves the constant observance of suspicious conduct not only in an undercover capacity by men with eyes and ears, but
perhaps more typically by the use of sophisticated scientific devices, such
as high-powered binoculars, telephotography, infrared searchlights, detectaphones, "bugs" and closed television circuits." Like the affirmative
trap, police surveillance involves a crucial prudential judgment equally
open to question: That police acquiescence in the commission or attempted commission of an offense, which might otherwise not have been
committed if police presence and authority were known and felt, is
10 Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low Visibility
Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 545, 560 (1960).
1 See O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION (1956). DASH, SCHWARTZ
& KNOWLTON, THE EAVESDROPMERS (1959), contains (in Part Two-Eavesdropping: The
Tools) the most complete review of the technological developments in this field.
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necessary to incarcerate those who, because they once committed an offense with police cognizance, have committed or will commit crimes
which otherwise escape police detection.
Harassment characteristically involves the badgering of certain "offenders" by the police in temporarily detaining or arresting them without an intention to prosecute. 12 Harassment involves a questionable
judgment: That overzealous, unconstitutional police methods, such as
arrest without suspicion, "tip-overs" or illegal searches and seizures resulting in the forfeiture of prosecution, are necessary to dislocate criminal
13
activity which would be more difficult to deter by legitimate means.
All three devices are also similar in their circumvention of constitutional guarantees which are triggered by the more "traditional" police
methods of search and interrogation. 14
But the affirmative trap has several significant tactical advantages over
its alternatives. Unlike surveillance, it does not demand a sustained commitment of personnel or require the skillful use of scientific detection
devices. Moreover, the police, in initiating and participating in the of12 Goldstein, supra note 10, at 580: "Harassment is the imposition by the police,
acting under color of law, of sanctions prior to conviction as a means of ultimate
punishment, rather than as a device for the invocation of criminal proceedings. Characteristic of harassment are efforts to annoy certain "offenders" both by temporarily
detaining or arresting them without intention to seek prosecution and by destroying
or illegally seizing their property without any intention to use it as evidence."
13 But the sole objective of harassment is not to "drive crime out of the city." An
alternate goal is to get information.
14 Aside from unreasoned dictum in Banks v. United States, 249 F.2d 672, 674 (9th
Cir. 1957), that entrapment is "in violation of the due process provision of the Fifth
Amendment," no case has been found which holds or intimates that the defense rests
upon constitutional grounds. Judge Parker in Sorrells v. United States, 57 F.2d 973,
978 (4th Cir. 1932), specifically denied that constitutional guarantees served as grounds
for recognizing the defense.
The general rule is that there is no right to be free from police surveillance provided the police have reasonable grounds for believing that the law is being violated
or that the defendant has committed crimes. The cases are collected in Donnelly, supra
note 2, at 1096 n.16, 1097 n.17. This basic rule was recently affirmed in the interesting
case of People v. Crowley, 193 Cal. App. 2d 310, 14 Cal. Rptr. 112 (1961). But see the
recent case of Giancana v. Hoover, Civil No. 63C-1145, N.D. Ill., July 22, 1963, preliminary injunction stayed pending appeal, Hoover v. Giancana, Appeal Nos. 14271-73,
7th Cir., July 26, 1963, in which the district court enjoined the F.B.I. from a program
of harassment and surveillance directed against the complainant. The restraining order
was stayed pending appeal on jurisdictional grounds. The legal advantage of surveillance stems from the physical penetration requirement for an illegal search. Silverman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961). However, this advantage may soon be lost in the
light of the qualifications in the majority opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas' well reasoned
separate concurring opinion which argued that the physical penetration rule is an
anachronism and the recent dictum in Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962), to the
effect that the crucial notion is privacy. If the physical penetration requirement is
dropped the police may be forced to place even greater reliance on the affirmative
trap.
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fense, have the opportunity to be dose to the transaction at all times,
and thus the risk of losing either evidence or the offender is reduced. On
the other hand the device does not require the police to abandon prosecution, as does a program of harassment.
The use of the device, however, is limited by both tactical considerations and legal doctrine. Obviously, the affirmative trap is an awkward and difficult device to use in the detection of crimes of violence.
And where the consent of the victim vitiates an essential element of the
crime, its use immediately presents the "target" with a defense-noncommission of the crime.15 Thus in a prosecution under a general assault
statute, conviction of a defendant who put his hands on an undercover
agent's privates after gestures of invitation to do so was reversed on the
ground that under the assault statute "the touching of an apparently
willing and competent person is not an assault."'16 Similarly a prosecution for criminal fraud failed where the "victims" of the fraud were
police officers who were not misled by the false statements of the accused.' 7
The narcotic sales statute, however, presents a perfect situation for
the use of the device. Consent does not vitiate the offense. Narcotic sales
often take place between two persons who are not well acquainted.
Through the use of informers undercover agents can insert themselves
into the transactions without arousing suspicion. As a result it is not
surprising that in almost all of the recent cases where the defense of
entrapment is raised, the offense with which the defendant was charged
was the sale of narcotics.' 8 Interestingly enough, the three states with
15 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932) (dictum); Love v. People, 160
Ill. 501, 43 N.E. 710 (1896); State v. Nelson, 232 N.C. 602, 61 S.E.2d 626 (1950). The
authorities are somewhat in conflict on this point and there is some ill reasoned opinion that passive acquiescence or even facilitation of the offense-so long as the defendant himself performs all the legally requisite acts-does not constitute consent
vitiating the offense. This result is reached on the theory that consent is given only
to the performance of acts necessary to expose the crime and not to the commission of
the crime itself. See People v. Rodriguez, 61 Cal. App. 69, 214 Pac. 452 (1923); People
v. Smith, 251 11. 185, 95 N.E. 1041 (1911).
16 Guarro v. United States, 237 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
17 People v. Schroeder, 132 Cal. App. 2d 1, 281 P.2d 297 (1955).
18 In addition to the situational unsuitability of the device for crimes of violence and
the vitiating consent problem, there are administrative considerations which restrict
the use of the "controlled buy" almost exclusively to narcotic sale cases. Although the
device was reported to be used occasionally to ferret out abortion and prostitution
offenses, several difficulties were noted. The prostitution cases break down into three
categories: First, the "street walkers," second the "B girls," and third the "call girls."
Toward the street walkers the police have a general policy of laissez faire. Their feelings, corroborated by the prosecutor, are that "there are so many of these girls we
don't know what to do with them. So long as they aren't 'sandbagging' anybody or
operating in places where their activity is objected to, our policy is let well enough
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the biggest "narcotics problem"'19 have taken distinctly variant positions
as to the permissible scope of the affirmative trap. New York apparently
does not recognize the defense. 20 California, on the other hand, gives the
alone. Of course if their solicitation is obvious, the street patrol officer is bound to
bring them in. But he doesn't go looking." It was also mentioned that it is very difficult for an officer to make a solicitation without it looking as though he had suggested the idea to the woman. On the other hand, there is no need for the officers
to solicit the "B girls" for that is the very office of the "target." The tactic here is to
"watch and wait" after going to the appropriate location. An affirmative trap will
occasionally be laid for the "call girls." Invariably, however, the police have access to
information and find the raid to be the appropriate device for penetrating the operation. But see People v. Van Scoyk, 20 Ill. 2d 232, 170 N.E.2d 151 (1960).
Three reasons appear for the restricted use of the device in abortion cases. First,
the police find it difficult to obtain willing and convincing decoys. Second is the practical limitation that the prosecution must be for attempt, and this is often difficult
to prove. A third limitation, (not explicitiy recognized by the police interviewed but
surmised from the attitudes expressed) is that an affirmative trap for an abortion case
usually requires penetration of ostensible professional respectability.
19 One of the principal defects in most discussions of narcotics is lack of clarity as
to what the "problem" actually is. Is it distribution and the concomitant wrecking of
the financial structure of the community? Is it public expenditure of funds for rehabilitation? Is it the incidence of crime that is supposed to be a direct result of
addiction? Is it the enraging of the moral sense of the community? Available information on the extent of "The Problem" is sparse and generally inadequate. A complete
review of the statistics will not be attempted here, but the following may be taken to
illustrate to some extent the recognized comparative trends.
TOTAL ADDICTS AND REPORTED VIOLATIONS

New York
California
Illinois

20,648
7,411
6,533

1962

1961

1960
Total
Addictsa
Dec. 31

Violationsb

Total
A ddictse
Dec. 31

417
424
137

21,813
7,592
6,924

Violationsd

Total
Addictse
Dec. 31

Violationsf

416
301
118

22,031
7,412
7,034

368
261
217

a U.S. TREASURY DEPARTIENT, BUREAU OF NARCOTICS, TRAFFIC IN OPIUM AND OTHER

DANGEROUS DRUGS FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1960, p. 68, table 2 (1961).

b Id. at p. 69, table 4.
c

U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, BUREAU OF NARCOTICS, TRAFFIC IN OPIUM AND OTHER

DANGEROUS DRUGS FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1961, p. 60, table 2 (1962).

d Id. at p. 62, table 5.
e U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, BUREAU OF NARCOTICS, TRAFFIC IN OPIUMs AND OTHER

DANGEROUS DRUGS FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1962, p. 61, table 2 (1963).
f Id. at p. 62, table 4.
20 People v. Schacher, 181 Misc. 769, 771, 47 N.Y.S.2d 371, 372 (Magis. Ct. 1944)
is well settled that entrapment is not recognized as a defense in New
(dictum): "[I]t
York State." No cases were cited to support this proposition. A case that may be responsible for the belief that the defense is unavailable in New York is Board of
Comm'rs of Excise v. Backus, 29 How. Pr. 33, 42 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1864, where the court
had occasion to say in dictum: "[lT]his plea has never . . .availed to shield crime ...
and it is safe to say that under any code of civilized . . . ethics, it never will." The
nonrecognition of the defense in New York has only the status of belief since (ac-
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defense liberal recognition. 2' Illinois recognizes the defense but narrowly
22
limits its application.
I.

JUDICIAL DOCTRINE

The Illinois cases have never adequately articulated the doctrinal
foundation of the defense of entrapment. In a recent case the Illinois
Supreme Court found it sufficient to observe only that it is "deeply rooted
in Illinois and federal law."2 3 As a result it is necessary to turn to the
federal cases for an exposition of the doctrinal foundations of the defense.
24
The positions of the majority and minority in Sorrells v. United States,
25
and its more recent counterpart, Sherman v. United States, illustrate
the possible approaches.
In Sorrells the majority26 based the defense on congressional intent.
Entrapment is established when,
the criminal design originates with the officers of the Government, and they implant in the mind of an innocent person the
and induce its comdisposition to commit the alleged offense
27
mission in order that they may prosecute.
The Court justified its finding of congressional "intent" on the ground
that a police device designed "to cause, to create crime in order to punish
28
it... is unconscionable [and] contrary to public policy." In the opinion
of the majority, violation of this public policy by the government warrants an exception to the general rule that instigation of a criminal offense by another will not exculpate the defendant. 29 To determine
whether the defendant was possessed of the requisite proclivities "the
predisposition and criminal design of the defendant are relevant" and
his past record and reputation are admissible in evidence. 30 For the
majority, police conduct must be evaluated in the light of the particular
cording to a prominent defense counsel) there is overwhelming reluctance to urge it
in face of the above dicta, and, more importantly, the understanding that the defense
admits the commission of the acts constituting the offense. It was also mentioned that
the type of defendant against whom the device is characteristically used is prosecuted
for "minor" offenses so that the "cost" of the defense is too high.
21 See People v. Benford, 51 Cal. 2d 884, 345 P.2d 928 (1959).
2d 100, 185 N.E.2d 874 (1962).
22 See People v. Toler, 26 Ill.
23 People v. Hall, 25 111.2d 297, 300, 185 N.E.2d 143, 145 (1962).

24 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
25 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
26 Justices Hughes, Van Devanter, Sutherland, Butler and Cardozo. Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes wrote the opinion.
27 287 U.S. at 442.
28 Id. at 444, citing Butts v. United States, 273 Fed. 35, 88 (8th Cir. 1921).
29 Id. at 442; see PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 847-52 (1957).

30 287 U.S. at 441, 451-52.

1963]

DEVICE AND DEFENSE

defendant's reluctance (or willingness) to commit crime as shown by
his past record and reputation. If the defendant's past conduct shows
him reluctant, then it is more readily to be inferred that the "genesis of
intent" was with the government.
In concurring, the minority3' explicitly rejected congressional intent
as the basis of the defense. Rather, "it is the province of the court ...

to

protect itself and the government from such prostitution of the criminal
law."3 2 Judicial rather than legislative integrity is at stake. For the
minority the defendant is not set at liberty because the genesis of intent
lay with the government, but because "reprehensible methods"3 3 "ought
not to be permitted by any self-respecting tribunal."3 4 Police conduct is
to be evaluated in the light of general standards. The record and reputation of the defendant are irrelevant and inadmissible.3 5 The test is not
whether the conduct of the government exceeds the particular defendant's
susceptibility, but whether it falls below standards which would be a
"sacrifice of decency. The enforcement of this policy calls upon the
court ... to appraise their [the facts'] effect upon the administration of
justice." 36
In Sherman3 7 the new Court split the same way. The majority38 again
bases the defense on congressional "intent" inferred from public policy.
The genesis of intent test is to be applied by means of "an appropriate
and searching inquiry into [the defendant's] ... conduct and predisposi39
tion."
In a concurring opinion Mr. Justice Frankfurter4o expanded the
position of the minority in Sorrells. The defense is based on the federal
courts' "recognized jurisdiction to formulate and apply 'proper standards
for the enforcement of the federal criminal law ....
".41 The minimum
standards of police conduct are those "to which common feelings respond,
for the proper use of governmental power." 42 Since it is "wholly irrele31 Justices Roberts, Brandeis and Stone. Mr. Justice Roberts wrote the opinion. Mr.
Justice McReynolds dissented.
32 287 U.S. at 457.
33 Id. at 453.
34 Id. at 455.
35 Id. at 459.
36 Id. at 455.
37 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
38 Justices Warren, Black, Burton, Clark and Whittaker. Mr. Chief Justice Warren
wrote the opinion.
39 356 U.S. at 373, quoting Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932).
40 Justices Douglas, Harlan and Brennan joined in the opinion.
41 356 U.S. at 380, citing McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943).
42 Id. at 382.
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vant" to ask if the "intention... originated with the defendant," 43 past
44
records, conduct and reputation are inadmissible in evidence.
The test for the minority is whether the conduct of the police will
trap only those who, objectively considered, are ready and willing to
45
commit crime.
An early Illinois entrapment case noted a preference for the reasoning
of the minority in Sorrells.46 Although succeeding cases have not shed
any further light on the basis of the defense in Illinois, the genesis of
intent test favored by the majority in Sorrells and Sherman now has
judicial and statutory sanction in Illinois:
A person is not guilty of an offense if his conduct is incited
or induced by a public officer or employee, or agent of either,
for the purpose of obtaining evidence for the prosecution of
such person. However, this Section is inapplicable if a public
officer or employee, or agent of either, merely affords to such person the opportunity or facility for committing an offense in
furtherance of a criminal purpose which such person has origi47
nated.
The pivotal words in the statute are "criminal purpose which such person has originated." This phrase appears to be the basis for the drafting
committee's comment that "Section 7-12 states the defense in general
terms in essentially the same language which the Illinois Supreme Court
uses in cases citing with approval the Sorrells case." 48
The leading Illinois entrapment decision is indeed a paradigm of such
language:
[E]ntrapment can exist only when the criminal intent originates
in the mind of the entrapping officer, and if such intent arose
in the mind of the accused, there is no entrapment ....49
Subsequent Illinois cases are entirely consistent. Representative is the extended discussion in People v. Hall:
[W]here it appears that the officer of the law or their agents
have conceived and planned a criminal offense and have incited.. . the accused into committing an offense which he other43 Ibid.
44 Id.

at 382.

45 Id. at 383.
46 In re Horowitz, 360 Ill. 313, 196 N.E. 208 (1935). The court merely noted that the

minority basis was "simpler." But the court went on to formulate the standard against
which police conduct should be measured in the terms of the Sorrells majority.
47 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-12 (1961).
48 JoINT COMM. TO REVISE THE ILLINOIS CRIMINAL CODE, TENTATIVE FINAL DRAFT OF
THE PROPOSED ILLINOIS REvIsE

CRIMINAL CODE OF

1961, 204 (1960).

49 People v. Outten, 13 Ill. 2d 21, 23, 147 N.E.2d 284, 286 (1958).
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wise would not have committed and had no intention of committing, entrapment is established and no conviction may be
had ....

On the other hand, entrapment is not available as a

defense to one who has the intent to commit the crime, and
does so merely because an officer of the law, for the purpose of
securing evidence, affords such person the opportunity to commit
a criminal act, or purposely aids or encourages him in its perpetration. 5o
In order to determine whether or not the intent originated with the
defendant the Illinois cases hold that "the predisposition and criminal
design of the defendant . . . [are] relevant, and the People may . . .
introduce such evidence relating thereto . . . ."51 Characteristically this
takes the form of prior convictions. For instance, in People v. Hall the
court denied the defendant's entrapment plea, observing that "the record
...
reveals... that defendant, wise in the ways of narcotics traffic, and
already once convicted of possession, was predisposed .... -52 But proof of
prior convictions is not necessary in order to show that the intent originated with the accused. "[A]lthough the defendant had no prior criminal
record, this factor alone cannot overcome evidence of his ability and instant willingness to make the unlawful sale as soon as the opportunity
53
to do so was presented."
Two other factors serve to locate the genesis of intent in the accused:
an existing course of the same or similar conduct 54 and ready complaisance in the commission of the offense. 55 Did the defendant perform
the solicited criminal act without hesitation, "considering the stealth and
secrecy with which the traffic in narcotic drugs is carried on"? 56 Did he
50 People v. Hall, 25 Ill. 2d 297, 800, 185 N.E.2d 143, 145 (1962).
51 People v. Outten, 13 I1. 2d 21, 25, 147 N.E.2d 284, 286 (1958). See also People v.
Gonzales, 25 Ill. 2d 235, 238, 184 N.E.2d 833, 835 (1962); People v. Wells, 25 Ill. 2d
146, 150, 182 N.E.2d 689, 692 (1962).
52 People v. Hall, 25 Ill. 2d 297, 300, 185 N.E.2d 143, 145 (1962).
53 People v. Gonzales, 25 Ill. 2d 235, 238, 184 N.E.2d 833, 834 (1962).
54 The defendant is usually characterized as "wise in the ways of narcotics traffic,"
People v. Hall, 25 Ill. 2d 297, 300, 185 N.E.2d 143, 145 (1962), because his "ready access
to a source of narcotics drugs, together with his familiarity with the narcotics trade
are completely incompatible with an otherwise innocent victim." People v. Wells, 25
Ill. 2d 146, 150, 182 N.E.2d 689, 692 (1962). See also People v. McSmith, 23 Ill. 2d 87,
95, 178 N.E.2d 641, 645 (1961). Among the earlier cases are People v. Clark, 7 Ill. 2d
163, 130 N.E.2d 195 (1955); People v. Gaugliata, 362 Ill. 427, 429, 200 N.E. 169, 170
(1936) (prosecution witness testified to the purchase of narcotics regularly from the
defendant three or four months before the trap, and defendant's record confirmed this).
55 People v. Clark, 25 Ill. 2d 331, 332, 185 N.E.2d 191, 192 (1962): "All the testimony
...shows that [the officer and his agent] . . merely told the defendant they wanted
People v. Gonzales, 25 Ill.
to purchase narcotics and defendant agreed to sell .
2d 235, 184 N.E.2d 833 (1962) ('Instant willingness").
56 People v. McSmith, 23 Ill. 2d 87, 95, 178 N.E.2d 641, 645 (1961).

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:137

exhibit no more than "the natural caution and hesitancy than could be
57
expected of one engaged in the illegal narcotics trade"?
The recent cases recognize four principal inducements which locate
the intent in the government rather than the accused: appeals to friend6°
ship,58 sympathy,5 9 offers of excessive amounts of money and appeals
61
to the narcotic's need. However, the defendant must not only show that
62
such inducements were present, or even present in combination, but
that "undue, prolonged or persistent pressures were executed against
65
him.... that the inducement was dangled in front of him" or that he
64
was "played upon."
A recent Illinois case indicates that the defense in Illinois is accorded
perhaps the narrowest scope of any American jurisdiction where it is
recognized. In People v. Toler65 the defendant was approached over
twenty times within a short period by an informer-purchaser with pleas
to buy narcotics for the "son" of a "friend" who was said to be a heavy
narcotics addict with only a year to live. The defendant finally succumbed, and even though there was no monetary profit and he had no
prior record, the Illinois Supreme Court sustained his conviction, denying his plea of entrapment. 66
Id. at 94, 178 N.E.2d at 645.
People v. Gonzales, 25 Ill. 2d 235, 184 N.E.2d 833 (1962).
59 People v. Hall, 25 Ill. 2d 297, 185 N.E.2d 143 (1962). The informer-purchaser
represented that he was an addict and that the police officer was a friend who wanted
some "stuff" for "his woman" who was "sick."
60 In People v. Gonzales, 25 Il. 2d 235, 184 N.E.2d 833 (1962) the contention was
made that the price paid for the drugs was excessive.
61 People v. Wells, 25 Ill. 2d 146, '182 N.E.2d 689 (1962). The informer-purchaser,
knowing the defendant was an addict, offered to split any narcotics the defendant could
get, the informer paying the full price.
62 People v. Hall, 25 II1. 2d 297, 185 N.E.2d 143 (1962) (appeal to sympathy and
narcotics need); People v. Gonzales, 25 Ill. 2d 235, 184 N.E.2d 833 (1962) (offer of excessive price and appeal to friendship); People v. Wells, 25 Ill. 2d 146, 182 N.E.2d 689
(1962) (appeals to friendship and narcotics need).
63 People v. Hall, 25 Ill. 2d 297, 301, 185 N.E.2d 143, 148 (1962).
64 People v. Gonzales, 25 Ill. 2d 235, 238, 184 N.E.2d 833, 836 (1962). But if the
government itself supplies the drugs purchased there is entrapment per se. People v.
Strong, 21 Ill. 2d 320, 172 N.E2d 765 (1961). Compare People v. Gray, 27 Ill. 2d 527,
190 N.E.2d 368 (1963).
65 26 Ill. 2d 100, 185 N.E.2d 855 (1963).
66 This decision is the only one to split the Illinois Supreme Court on the issue of
entrapment. The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Schaefer and joined in by
Justice Klingbiel, placed particular emphasis on the lack of prior convictions and
the repeated solicitations. The majority opinion by Justice Dailey relied upon the
fact that the defendant, as the majority interpreted his actions, "had quick access to
substantial quantities of narcotics," and "the elaborate system of delivery whereby the
narcotics were never seen in his possession." The majority felt that these actions were
"hardly compatible with naivet6 and innocence." 26 Il1. 2d at 102, 185 N.E.2d at 876.
The present writer was informed by a Cook County State's Attorney that his fellow
57
58
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Earlier Illinois cases, some of them involving invasions of reputed professional integrity, indicated that a necessary prerequisite to the use of
the device was a showing by the police of a reasonable cause to suspect
the target. 7 Under the recent wave of narcotics sale cases this requirement has been dropped. In the case of People v. Wells68 the court held
that it is not a necessary prerequisite to the use of the device that either
the police or the informer-purchaser have substantial reason to suspect
that the defendant is guilty of the solicited offense before a trap is laid.
"Dry runs" and "spot checks" are condoned.
Three issues of trial administration of the defense should also be noted:
pleading, burden of proof and the function of the judge and jury. The
defense need not be raised by a special plea in bar but may be raised
under a general plea of not guilty. 9 Entrapment is an affirmative defense
under the Illinois Criminal Code which requires that:
unless the State's evidence raises the issue involving the alleged
defense, the defendant, to raise the issue, must introduce some
70
evidence thereon.
Once such evidence has been introduced, however,
the State must sustain the burden of proving the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as to that issue [in this case
entrapment] together with all the other elements of the offense.71
While the question has never been decided in Illinois at the appellate
level, the invariable practice has been to consider the defense as an issue
for the jury.
II.

POLICE AND PROSECUTOR ADMINISTRATION

The principal means of municipal narcotics law enforcement in the
city of Chicago is the controlled buy.72 Every controlled buy harbors a
potential entrapment defense, for in every case the threshold elements
of the defense have been met: official solicitation to commit a crime.
Within the last five years the Illinois Supreme Court has decided three
members all felt that Toler was "probably entrapped," and that the only reason he
was prosecuted for sale was because he "refused to turn in his supplier."
67 E.g., In re Horowitz, 860 Ill. 313, 196 N.E. 208 (1935) (unethical practice of law);
People v. Beach, 266 III. App. 272 (1932) (violation of the Medical Practice Act).

68 25 Ill. 2d 146, 149, 182 N.E.2d 689, 691 (1962).
69 People v. Strong, 21 Ill. 2d 320, 324, 172 N.E.2d 765, 767 (1961); People v. Van
Scoyk, 20 Ill. 2d 232, 235, 170 N.E.2d 151, 152 (1960); People v. Outten, 13 Ill. 2d 21,

24, 147 N.E.2d 285, 286 (1958).
70 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 3-2(a) (1961).

3-2(1) (1961).
72 Roughly 80% of all the narcotics cases are sale cases and 100% of the sale cases
are detected by means of the controlled buy.
71 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §
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times as many cases involving an entrapment defense as it did in the previous thirty. 73 Despite these facts, both police and prosecutor unequivocally state that so far as they are concerned the defense is a "dead horse."
The single factor quoted by these agencies to substantiate their position
is that "the law is on our side." But independent of appellate doctrine
there exists at present a complex of factors in the machinery of enforcement which justifies their position and which would do so even if appellate doctrines were even more favorable to the defendant. However, these
factors are not natural adaptations to a rational system of enforcement.
Instead they are coincidental results of a system of selective enforcement,
narrowly focused on petty suppliers and consumers. Present enforcement
is like a Volpcne's Mansion and its lawns are not well kept.
4

Police7
1. The Decision to Trap. Although the Lieutenant in charge of the
Narcotics Section is formally recognized as having the power and authority to make the decision that the controlled buy should be the principal means of narcotics law enforcement, this policy decision has not
been an entirely conscious one. When questioned as to the reasons for
this policy, he stated, "It's just been standard operating procedure. I
don't know who originated it. I think it's always been this way." "Necessity" was given as the reason for its continued use. Surveillance was ruled
out for a number of reasons. The Section staffs only thirty-five field officers, and the "watch and wait" tactic was said to be too taxing on the
personnel resources of the Section, in contrast to the "buy and bust."
The police reported that it is especially difficult to make a sale case
without direct, close observation and the opportunity for immediate
arrest after the completion of the transaction. Therefore co-participation
is essential. The sale transaction was reported difficult to identify from
a distance. And even if identifiable in a particular case, it is still difficult
to prove that there has been a sale-that one party simply has not been
in possession of money and the other in possession of narcotics all the
while.
A.

73 The cases are collected in 10 ILL. DiG. 80-82 (1952); ILL. DIG. 5-8 (1962 Supp.).
The figures are: For the last five years, thirteen; for the previous thirty years, four. In
only one of the recent cases was the defense sustained. People v. Strong, 21 Ill. 2d 320,
172 N.E.2d 765 (1961).
74 The material contained in the "police" and "prosecutor" sections is derived from
a series of interviews with members of the Chicago Police Department's Narcotics Section and the Cook County State's Attorney's Office conducted for the most part in a
three week period during March and April of 1963. The officers and prosecutors
were interested and cooperative. Many of the ideas which are incorporated in this
paper originated with them. Quotations are not verbatim but were taken down by
means of the key word method. During the interview I wrote down the key words
in the interviewee's statements. That evening I typed out the conversation to the best
of my recollection based on the transcription.
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There is a further difficulty: the opportunity for the defendant to
dispose of the narcotics or flee if he identifies the officers approaching
him. This, the police reported, is the principal reason why enforcement
is concentrated on sale rather than possession cases. As one officer stated:
You know it's much easier to make a sale, rather than a possession case. If a guy sees you coming at him kind of fast, he'll
throw it down the sewer, up on a roof, flush it down a toilet,
or if he's inside somewhere shove it up his rectum. They're
[the narcotics] usually small little things, wrapped in a tin-foil
about the size of a half-a-stick of chewing gum and hard to find.
Police make sale cases out of choice as well as necessity. The stiff
minimum penalty75 and the unremitting nature of the sale statute in
failing to distinguish between addicting and nonaddicting narcotics, as
well as the amount sold and to whom,7 6 make the sale offense particularly attractive to the police. The threat of long imprisonment makes an
offer to the arrestee "to do himself some good" a strong lever with which
to pry information.
The targets of the enforcement program are in large part defined by
the resources of the Section. One of the most remarkable facts about
municipal narcotics law enforcement is that it seldom reaches above the
"street trade," the street addict and nonaddict pusher. Although the objective is to trade information in order to reach the peddler, this is rarely
achieved, and only in the most exceptional cases does municipal enforcement reach the supplier. Almost all the cases involve "nickle-dime" buys
(five and ten dollars worth). It was reported that when such an offender
is arrested, due to fear of bodily harm, or at the very least of "being cutoff" from his source, he will inform only on his competitors-only
laterally and never vertically. The Section is rarely successful in parlaying
its information up the ladder of the narcotics hierarchy. There are sharp
divisions between enforcement efforts at the municipal, state and federal
levels. The city agency operates from the "bottom" up with the peddler
as the anticipated ceiling. The state and federal agencies, largely on the
basis of geographical jurisdiction, operate from the "top" down. When
asked if there were any effort to tie the cases together, an officer responded:
Well, if I establish good contact on a personal basis with the
Feds, then we swap information sometimes. But they're a much
bigger operation. And the State boys, well, if they get a case that
brings them into the city, or as part of their standard city pro75 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 22-40 (1961), provides for a ten year minimum penalty.
76 The statute, for instance, does not distinguish between "hard" and "soft" narcotics, e.g., heroin and marijuana.
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gram, then they pursue it. We would have to employ a full-time
staff of statisticians down here to tie in all the cases we get.
But sometimes, when to any clever guy something appears obvious, like seven arrests in front of the same house, well then we
77
tie them together and make a big arrest.
It was in response to a comment by this writer about the narrow focus
of municipal law enforcement, the limitations on developing information, the division in narcotics law enforcement on a geographical basis,
and the inherent conflict involved in the trading of full enforcement for
information, that one of the officers characterized the present enforcement program as "Operation Crabgrass."
It is difficult to tell whether resources influence policy, or policy dictates resources. Nevertheless, the following observations may be made.
The police in the Municipal Narcotics Section have a clear perception
that the "Feds do their job and we do ours," almost a "to each his own"
attitude. The police feel considerable public pressure to make a "fair
quota" of narcotics arrests-and the street offender at least is a typical
violator. In fact the Lieutenant in charge of the Section said that the
goal of municipal enforcement is "to keep the streets from turning into
a jungle." This public pressure is principally communicated to the police
by phone calls from the public at large. Invariably the callers provide
information of only a general nature, complaining that some narcotics
addicts have been eating at someone's restaurant, that someone's neighbor's son is an addict, or that "a shop-lifter who got away had a glassy
look in his eyes." With such general information, the officers find it very
difficult to "get themselves cut in" on the alleged transactions, or even
to locate the suspects.
Several moves are being planned by the Section to extend the scope
of their enforcement program. 78 One plan that is presently being considered is to
77 Now that the section is concentrating its efforts on "bigger fish" more frequent
duplication of federal and municipal efforts occur. The officers related one instance
where undercover agents from both agencies-unknown to each other-pulled up
outside a house in anticipation of a "big hit," "tripped" across one another and lost
the arrest.
78 Some of these plans appear to have gone into effect. Chicago Sun Times, July 29,

1963, p. 14, cols. 1-4: "Chicago police made a purchase of 26V pounds of processed
marijuana and promptly placed three men under arrest, Sunday. The purchase by
two undercover agents was one of the biggest made in Chicago history, said Lt.
Cornelius Casey, head of the narcotics section of the Vice Control Division .... Arrested in the police trap were Luis J. Cuello, 24, of Miami, accused of making the
actual sale, and two accomplices, Julio Rodriquez, 27, of 3620 W. Walton, and Etien
Rivera, 27, of 648 W. Grace.... The undercover agents, who had completely won the

confidence of the gang members, met with the three men at a Far North Side location.
The three asked $2,000 for the marijuana, which had a retail value of $25,000 ....
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[T]ake one of the fancier men, get a big car with out of state
plates, and let him flash a few "saw-bucks" in some of the bigger
night spots, and see if he can't get himself cut in on some big
sales.
Another is to increase the number of teams on night duty. At present
only two or three are operating on a regular basis, although if a "day"
officer gets a lead which cannot be "developed" until later in the evening or at night, he will remain with his team to follow it through. The
officers reported that they suspected, and had been told, that there are
some "pretty heavy deals" made at night, and plan to tap this source of
violation.
The scope of present municipal enforcement is affected by the nature
of the police assignment itself. All of the field officers act in an undercover capacity, assuming the various guises of addict, pimp, musician and
one even a small-time pusher to university students. The thirty-five field
officers work in teams of three. Almost half of them are Negro, and
most of the rest are of Italian and Latin extraction with fluency in
Spanish. The physical characteristics of the officers limit the roles which
they can assume and the areas where they can successfully operate. One
of the Negro officers reported, "You know, there's a lot of traffic going
up there on ... Street. But I can't go in there. The only time I get to
wear a tie is when I go to court." As a result the Section has little mobility
79
to enforce other than against the lower class violator.
Satisfied that the coast was dear, Cuello took one of the agents to a room in the
hotel, where the $2,000 in marked bills was paid and a suitcase containing the marijuana was turned over. Riding down in the elevator, the agent placed Cuello under
arrest. Simultaneously, other police officers closed in on the parked car. The second
undercover agent was arrested along with his two companions. It wasn't until these
tvo men were taken to the West Chicago Station that they realized their companion
was an undercover agent."
79 The Chicago Police Department is reported to have taken the position that
narcotics traffic is a victimization of Negroes by whites. In Rooney, The Negro in
Chicago: 1963 Rackets Pay Off Big-for Whites, Chicago Daily News, August 12, 1963,
p. 1, col. 5-8, p. 4, col. 4-7, the following statements were attributed to Deputy Police
Superintendent Joseph Morris: "The Narcotics and policy rackets in this city are very
well organized. . . . [Narcotics] is not as widespread across the community as policy
is . . . but it is a serious police problem on two counts. There are some 6,500 addicts
here in Chicago. At least 90 per cent of them are Negro. Now, a junkie will do anything to get money to feed his habit. Anything. The result is that the male addict
steals. And the female addict becomes a prostitute. Our experience here indicates
that probably 75 per cent of our larcenies and burglaries in Chicago are committed
by addicts. [Query.) Addicts commit a smaller percentage of robberies. These junkies
are spending $25 to $100 a day to buy heroin. . . . [Query.] When they steal, a fence
(receiver of stolen property) will give them 10 cents on the dollar of the value of the
[I]t is a very small
loot. The fence will then get rid of it at a considerable profit ....
number of top white syndicate mobsters who are reaping great profits. We know of
instances of a hoodlum investing $5,000 to get a couple of kilos of heroin from the
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Because the resources available to the police define their targets as the
street addict and nonaddict pusher and the type of offense as the "nickledime" sale, they insure against the likelihood of entrapment. As one of
the sergeants put it:
We have too many "real" cases to go out and entrap somebody.
Our biggest problem is to overcome suspicion, making sure the
man doesn't escape, and recovering the money. If you act too
anxious, that only makes them suspicious.
The abundance of "real" cases and the absence of "priority" targets
means that police tactics are designed to be more precautionary than
incendiary.
In summary, as a policy decision the use of the controlled buy is only
in part a response to the "necessity" growing out of the physical situation inherent in the range of possible violations. It is really part of a
larger policy decision to structure enforcement along the lines of a
"holding action," "to keep the streets from turning into a jungle." And
this larger policy decision turns upon three factors: Response to public
demands, a desire to see immediate results obtained from the resources
at hand and the perception that narcotics law enforcement is somehow
"platted," that each man's home is his castle. Full enforcement is consistently traded for information and enforcement against the sources of
supply is abandoned for the development of "real" cases. In fact there
is room to doubt whether the policy decision to use the controlled buy
is really a decision at all. Instead, present enforcement methods appear
to be mechanical rather than inventive responses to the range of problems which narcotics violations present.
2. The Decision to Trap: Tactics. The decision as to how, when, by
whom and where to make a controlled buy is left to the field undercover
agents. Typically the officers will have arrested someone as the result of
a prior "controlled buy" and secured information from him of another
violator of equal stature.8 0 The informer will then make a contact and
arrange a sale. He will be searched completely for narcotics and money
and then driven to the prearranged location where at least one of the
undercover agents will be stationed. He will complete the transaction,
Near East. And, some of these investments have brought profits of 500 per cent of the
original investment."
The FBI UNIFORM CRIME REPORTs FOR THE UNrrED STATES 1961, table 40, at 181
(1962), reports that in 1961, 39,452 burglaries, 27,678 larcenies or thefts of $50 and
over and 39,990 larcenies or thefts of under $50 "known to the police" occurred in
Chicago. This totals 107,120 offenses. Accepting the 75% estimate, the 6,500 addicts in
Chicago commit 81,040 offenses a year, or 12.36 burglaries or larcenies per addict per
year.
80 It was reported that almost fifty per cent of the arrestees on a narcotics sale violation either give information or agree to act as :'special agents."
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return to the car with the drugs, a field test will be run to see if they
are narcotics, and then both he and the seller placed under arrest.8 '
Although this is the procedure in the majority of the cases, the police
have a definite order of tactical priority which is largely in response to
pressures from the prosecutor to make "cases that will stick"--cases that
satisfy credibility and evidentiary requirements. Because the informerpurchaser is a particularly impeachable witness his account of the transaction is not likely to be highly persuasive to a jury. The police have
established a series of tactical preferences which run approximately as
follows:
(1) Have the informer "cut" the undercover agent in directly to the
seller as a "friend" or "boss," and the transaction take place between the latter two parties.
(2) Have the informer make the initial buy, and "cut" the undercover
agent in on subsequent transactions.
(3) Make the informer a purchaser, and have the transaction take
place under the dose surveillance of an undercover agent
"planted!' nearby.
(4) Make the informer into a purchaser and let the transaction take
place in some interior location where it is not observable by the
police.
This order of preference results not only from prosecutor pressure but
from the undercover agents themselves who feel that they have a prestige
job which requires intelligence and they do not like the possibility of
being outsmarted by informer-purchasers who might "frame" a case by
going into an apartment building, paying a debt with the marked money,
and returning with narcotics from another party who has extended them
credit.82 The undercover agents are also conscious that the informerpurchaser is an interested party whose opportunity to "do himself some
good" turns upon whether he can make a buy. Thus they suspect that
out of police view and control he will make overweening appeals to
81 Where a series of buys are desired (usually to build evidence of a "course of
dealing" and thereby obviate any claim of entrapment) an alternative method is to
proceed with the transactions without the informer-purchaser. This has the added
advantage of not exposing the informer.
82 As was contended by the defendant in People v. Lynumn, 21 111. 2d 63, 171 N.E.2d
17 (1960), rev'd, Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963). "Defendant Lynumn testified
that Zeno [the informer] came to her apartment to pay her $23 that he owed her,
and $5 extra for keeping the money so long. She denied selling or giving anything to
Zeno. She testified that she said she sold the package to Zeno ... only after the police
had arrested her, told her she would lose her children and her aid to dependent
children, and promised leniency if she would cooperate." 21 Ill. 2d at 67, 171 N.E.2d
at 19. The Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that the statement given to the
police was coerced.
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narcotics need and play excessively on the sympathies of the seller, or
to make his efforts appear more important, plead and wheedle for more
narcotics than he has been given money to buy at the going rate, on the
grounds that he is in need of a "big bang." It is principally in the instance of informer purchases outside the control of the undercover
agents that the occasional instances of arguable entrapment under Illinois law occur. It was reported that resort to this tactic is necessary
in about eighty-five per cent of the cases. The other three methods do
not often present the possibility of entrapment because the police remain
in control of the transaction. The appellation "controlled buy" is less
likely to be a misnomer.
The "serial buy" tactic is used where the police desire to get the putative seller "in real tight" so that he is more likely to give information,
83
or where the first sales were faulty from an evidentiary point of view.
With the necessity of future transactions in mind, the undercover agent
must be able to transport the narcotics away from the seller. Frequently
the seller will demand that they be "shot up" right there. The agent must
explain that they are, for example, for his "woman who is sick," or for
a "friend who is 'real bad' (trying to, but cannot 'dry out')." The necessity
for this excuse, which also qualifies as an inducement, is made more
urgent by the fact that invariably the purchase is, in accord with the
usual practice 6f the Bureau, only for a small amount, and therefore can
be "shot up."
Where an "immediate bust" is desired the appeal must often be to
urgent narcotics need because otherwise the seller has an opportunity
to go into several stores and exchange the marked money or he may arrange delivery in such a way that he is never seen in possession. However,
in most cases the officers reported that the transactions are made without
much "conversation" and quite swiftly, for the police have found that
desperate appeals frequently make the seller suspicious. He will think
that either the potential buyer has been "turned off" by his regular
supplier because he is untrustworthy, has stolen narcotics from him or
he will suspect that the potential buyer is an undercover agent, and walk
away, denying that he has anything to do with narcotics.
Offers to sell rather than buy narcotics were reportedly never used by
the officers for two reasons. First, it is claimed that they have no access
to narcotics, since those seized in a controlled buy are immediately
marked, sent to the laboratory, and then destroyed under close security.
Further, it was reported that they were supervised by a superior officer
in accounting for the money used and the narcotics obtained. They
unanimously responded that the sale of narcotics would be per se en83 Usually where the marked funds were disposed of by the seller before his arrest.
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trapment without more,84 and stated that this was why devious means
such as "double plays" (buying from one with identified funds and then
selling the same narcotics to another) were not used. The present writer
was unable to obtain a full picture of the possible use of this device.
An offer to "split" where the defendant is told that if he goes to a
third party and buys the agent narcotics he will be paid in kind rather
than with money was thought by the officers to be entrapment.85 The
officers reported that they felt that the "random solicitation" or "spot
check," the attempt at a controlled buy with no information indicating
that the defendant would or could sell, was also entrapment per se.86
The threshold of police sensitivity to the defense often appeared to be
lower than that of the courts themselves. One officer was shocked to learn
from the author of the decision in People v. Toler 7 which held that
twenty-one solicitations did not constitute entrapment.
The same public pressures which demand that enforcement efforts be
made in the first place, combined with a natural desire on the part of
the officers to compile a good record, makes the police continually conscious of the problem of obtaining not only arrests but convictions. The
writer was present on two occasions when officers had lengthy discussions
on how to engineer an arrest without violating search and seizure requirements. An officer who loses cases due to excesses will character88
istically be asked "to find a spot somewhere else" in a "safe" place. If
the informal sanction of transfer is inadequate, the Police Regulations
provide for the formal sanctions of suspension and removal. Rule 374(8)
of the Chicago Police
Regulations prescribes removal of any officer who
"violates any law." 8 9 Ironically, the police appeared to be unaware of
the fact that under the Illinois Criminal Code a policeman who solicits
the commission of a crime has no defense to a charge of the crime of
solicitation. 90
The field officer's attitude toward his job, his expectations about the
effectiveness of the program of enforcement and his conception of the
84

It is. People v. Strong, 21 111. 2d 320, 172 N.E.2d 765 (1961).

85 It isn't. People v. Wells, 25 Ill. 2d 146, 182 N.E.2d 689 (1962). A "split" was held

to constitute entrapment in Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
86 It isn't. People v. Wells, 25 Ill. 2d 146, 182 N.E.2d 689 (1962).

26 Ill. 2d 100, 185 N.E.2d 874 (1963).
The officer who engineered the Toler case is apparently no longer with the
Narcotics Section.
87

88

89 CHICAGO POLICE REGULATIONS, rule 374(8) (1959).
90 Although it might be possible to infer a defense from an interlaced reading of

the statutes for an officer who instigates a trap, such an implied defense would be
contrary to the general statutory pattern. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-5 (1961),
Peace Officer's Use of Force in Making Arrest.
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role he is playing are all tempering influences on the readily presented
opportunities to be overzealous in his assigned task of co-participation
and solicitation to commit crime. The Narcotics Section is considered
by the undercover agents to be a "special unit" where both the security
and the level of expertise required are high. Secret work, requiring testimony to the officers' honesty in the form of rigid periodic security checks
and a knowledge of "secret crime," has made the officers extremely "honor
bound" and conscientious. Their attitude toward many of their targets
is distinctly ambivalent. On the one hand they store "lecture kits" for
,speeches before civic groups which may properly be called "chambers
of horrors" for they include all of the supposed paraphernalia of the drug
addict: Needles, burned spoons, and, somewhat anachronistically, brass
knuckles and long knives. On the other hand, they expressed and showed
definite sympathy for the addict who pushes simply to sustain his own
addiction. This writer was told several times:
These men are sick. They've all been dried out [taken a forced
cure in jail] at least once, and yet they go back. They just can't
stand the terrible lives they lead, so they try to escape to another world where everything is remote, a little happy, and they
can have a feeling of well-being. The addict is often involved in
a series of "minor" criminal acts, like homosexuality, purse
snatching, and shoplifting, but there are just as many rapes by
users as non-users.
However, all of the officers felt disgust for the peddler who is not addicted. Thus the police do make a differentiation among the various
types in the rather narrow category of "street offenders," and insofar as
there is a "priority target" it is the nonaddict peddler. What the officers
have learned themselves by their close association with the criminal
offenses they are trying to control is in conflict with what the public, or
their perception of what the public, demands of their efforts. Despite
this tension, it distinctly appeared that the officers' own notions were
often controlling, and this was especially clear in their reluctance to
extend offers to sell or split or pursue random solicitations of those whom
they had no reason to suspect of violation of the narcotics laws.
3. The Decision to Arrest, Book and Bring before the Prosecutor.
Except for the police decision to let the defendant out on a "pass" to
develop cases and information in the field, police decisions to arrest are
largely routine. In no case was a seller in a "controlled buy" released on
the street. The principal reason for a policy of "complete arrest" is the
desire to develop information, and the police feel that this can be done
only if the defendant feels that he is under a genuine threat of imprisonment.

1963]

DEVICE AND DEFENSE

In addition, the arrestee usually has little conception of his rights,
and so far as he can see he has either been "caught redhanded" or his
arrest is just part of a pattern which has been a fact of his life. The
writer was told:
Don't forget, these guys have come from families and jobs, where
the idea has always been to outwit the landlord and the boss.
Lots of them don't ever object to the unfairness. They don't
live in worlds where you have got privacy. Crime has always
been around them, and they think that sooner or later they will
fall into it.

The arrestee rarely objects, and the police often do not know that anything raising the entrapment issue has taken place. Secondly, the impetus
to object appears to be removed when the police offer to allow the
arrestee to "do himself some good" by assisting in purchases in the hope
that he may get a reduced charge, or do the same in exchange for a
"pass" to work indefinitely.
The decision to book is also routine. No cases were observed where
the police omitted the facts of sale from their reports in order to give
the arrestee what would amount to a reduced charge.
Although the release of an arrestee on a "pass" after he has been
brought to the station appears to provide an opportunity for administrative elimination of possible entrapment cases, the police unequivocally
stated that such a disposition was never made because they felt that the
defendant had been entrapped. Since the number and importance of the
suspect's contacts in the narcotics hierarchy are not directly relevant to
the defense of entrapment (except insofar as they might possibly be used
to show a criminal predisposition) it is unlikely that legitimate claims
of entrapment are muffled by the police decision to release the "useful"
arrestee on a pass.
B. Prosecutor
1. The Decision to Prosecute. The prosecutor's decision to prosecute
a case based on a controlled buy is not influenced by the existence of
facts raising a possible entrapment defense. The prosecutors were in
unanimous agreement that they had never heard of an instance of a
refusal to prosecute because of entrapment, nor would they, it was reported, ever accede to such a plea. Two principal factors account for this
refusal: the procedures by which narcotics cases are initially presented
for the prosecutor's consideration and the nature of the defense.
All cases are brought to the prosecutor's office by the police in the
form of investigation reports. These reports are brief elaborations of the
reports handed in to the Narcotics Section after arrest. They simply
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identify the parties involved, the time and place of the controlled buy,
the type of drug secured and the amount of money exchanged. Attached
is a chemist's certificate as to the nature of the drug.
The first step in the trial of every narcotics case is a preliminary hearing, a bench trial, at the Narcotics Court. Two of the new State's Attorneys, usually fresh from law school, are assigned to this court exclusively. They arrive at their offices and the reports, at this stage called
the "State's Attorneys' File," are lying on their desks. As one prosecutor
stated:
These cases are amazingly routine ....

We flip through the files,

the arresting officers meet us in our offices and we ride up [one
flight] to Narcotics Court. I usually say, "Usual case?" and he
says, "Yeah," and then we go to trial. So there's really no opportunity to see if there are any facts which might give rise to
an entrapment defense at this [first] stage [of prosecution].
Of course, the decision not to prosecute can come at any stage until
a verdict is returned. Nevertheless, all of the prosecutors interviewed
stated that in practice the first opportunity which they had to learn of
facts which might sustain a defense of entrapment was on cross-examination of the state's witnesses at trial. This is due to several factors. Principal
among them is that the defendant at preliminary hearing is sometimes
unrepresented, or, more frequently, represented by the Public Defender.
The Public Defender is in the same position as the prosecution with
regard to notice of facts warranting an entrapment defense. He has at
least as heavy a case load and sees his function as guarding against
"dear" abuses of police power, such as illegal searches and coerced confessions, making the state prove its case and saving the defendant from
self-incrimination. 91
If the defendant is not discharged at the preliminary hearing, he is
bound over to the Grand Jury on a finding of probable cause. But evi91 One of the prosecutors felt that the Public Defender did not often represent his
client as well as he might. "I've told those guys several times that they ought to press
their cases harder and not accept so many pleas." It was estimated that in over eighty
per cent of the bench trials and sixty per cent of the jury trials the defendant in the
typical narcotics sale case is represented by the Public Defender. It was reported by
the prosecutor, and admitted by one Public Defender, that the latter's job is even
more "political" than the State's Attorney's. Here, however, the method of appointment has a different impact. For while the State's Attorney is characteristically a
"young man on the way up" and likely to be a relentless litigator with little motivation to weigh the full impact of his decisions in the larger context of the criminal
process, the public defender is recruited from the swelled ranks of unsuccessful but
campaign active local ward lawyers in their middle forties. Their observed, as well as
reported, behavior was not that of the relentless litigator. At least in the typical
narcotics case their efforts appear to be directed towards insuring that the immediate
defendant is treated no worse than any other.
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dence presented at this hearing consists of little more than a slight
elaboration of the investigation report that was in the hands of the
State's Attorney in Narcotics Court.
It would seem that with such limited disclosure of the facts the entrapment defense would be an ideal surprise tactic for the defense and
that therefore the prosecutor would be sure to inquire into the issue.
However, sensitivity to the defense which might lead to full disclosure
in the preliminary hearing, before the Grand Jury or at arraignment is
low. This is due to a complex of factors.
First is the effect which police practices have on the expectations of
the prosecutor about the individual case. The controlled buy is the
standard detection method for narcotics sale offenses and the details of
its execution are largely routine. There is nothing remarkable in the
initial use of the device, and minor excesses are taken as a matter of
course. An enforcement policy focused on the many "real" cases and, in
the individual case, a sense of fairness resulting from the officers' perception of themselves as members of an elite are strong tempering influences on any gross abuses in the administration of the device. An
extremely low incidence of police conduct which might qualify as entrapment results-a situation which would still exist even if appellate
doctrine were more exacting. Consequently the prosecutor has little
reason to suspect that an entrapment has taken place.
In the extraordinary case where a possible defense is present (estimated
by one prosecutor to be about one in twenty) defense counsel will visit
the prosecutor and argue that the charges should be dropped because the
defendant was entrapped. The prosecutors never accede to this plea
because of the lack of appeal the defense has to their sense of oughtness,
because of their perception of their role in the criminal process, and because of their private ambitions.
It might be suspected that the resistance could be said to stem simply
from the fact that "the law is on our side." But the prosecutors were
found to have a distinct attitude toward the "entrapped defendant" in a
narcotics sale case. They felt that his only excuse was faulty police
methods, not a violation of the "letter" of the law, and the seriousness
of his crime showed that he was not "innocent." While they all felt that
the facts in Toler92 should have constituted entrapment, they all agreed
that they would not have refused to prosecute the case unless it was
shown "that the police officer twisted his [the defendant's] arm."
The first factor accounting for prosecutors' resistance to the defense
is their sense of oughtness. The police object violently whenever the
prosecutor reproaches them for bad practices and resent nullification
92 People v. Toler, 26 I1. 2d 100, 185 N.E.2d 874 (1962).
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of their efforts. Second, the routine nature of the narcotics cases-typically
presenting inarticulate, disengaged Negroes or shiftless Puerto Ricans or
Mexicans who speak little English, all assigned to the same prosecutors
before the same judge, all proceeding to the same State's Attorney, who
has been presenting all cases to the Grand Jury for over forty years-has
led to a routine characterization of the defendants by the prosecutor as
feigning stupidity, disrespectful and sinister. The factors which may
qualify the defendant as an exception because of faulty police practices,
particularly excessive inducement, are not scanned. Thus, once the "offense" is "serious" enough, all of the accused are lumped together.
The second factor accounting for prosecutor resistance to the defense
is their perception of the role they play in the criminal process. There
was unanimous agreement among the State's Attorneys that in narcotic
sale cases the jury will convict almost every time. Juries are especially
unresponsive to the plea of entrapment because the defendant admits the
commission of the crime and because the defendant must often take the
stand to establish the facts and he "looks bad." They also agreed that the
judges do not like the defense because the crime is so unpopular and
the law so popular. The State's Attorneys envisage their role in the
criminal process as one of full prosecution limited only by the probabilities of failure at trial.
The third factor is that the great majority of the State's Attorneys are
on short political tenure and are desirous of making reputations as relentless litigators with varied trial experience. They are conscious of
being "fresh" from school--often schools not among the highest ranked
-and many readily expressed a desire to "compensate." The career
prosecutor appeared much "mellower" and sympathetic, and confessed
that if he saw a dear case of entrapment, as he felt the Toler93 case was,
he would refuse to prosecute, even though he knew someone else in the
office would be assigned the case and that he might possibly win it.
In summary, then, the defense of entrapment never triggers the decision not to prosecute for several reasons. On the one hand, the infrequency of police practices which would sustain the defense means
that it is not an issue for which the prosecutor must remain on the alert.
Second, the scantiness of the investigative report, the cursory nature of
the interviewing process before trial, and the routine nature of the cases
and procedure do not admit of any "danger" signals. Last, in the occasional instances when defense counsel brings such facts to light before
jury trial, the prosecutor ii unpersuaded because of his sense of "oughtness" based on the nature of the defense (fa.ulty police methods), his
93 Ibid.
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expectations of the judge's and jurors' responses and his personal motivations.
2. The Decision to Charge. Until about a year ago the standing
policy of the State's Attorney's office was to reduce charges in narcotics
cases from sale to possession only in the most extenuating circumstances
and to pursue a policy of "full prosecution." Partly as a result of the
great number of acquittals that resulted, 94 partly as a result of an increasing case load 95 and due in large part to the judge's reluctance to
apply the stiff and unremitting minimum sentence of the sale statute,
the present policy is to reduce charges when it is felt that an acquittal
would otherwise result.
This fact, coupled with the hardened practice of the trial judges of
holding that the defense of entrapment is inconsistent with a denial of
the commission of the acts asserted under a general plea of not guilty,96
has resulted in a simple accommodation which renders the defense virtually obsolete. The defendant invariably takes a reduced charge rather
than risk the "all-or-nothing" defense of entrapment.
The prosecutor will reduce charges in a narcotics sale case on three
principal grounds:
(1) When the defendant has given valuable information to the police,
information which has led to at least several good cases.
(2) When problems of proof are presented and the prosecutor feels
that he can prove possession but not sale.
(8) When there has been a "minimal" violation of only the "letter"
of the law in a controlled buy.
The latter two grounds are important in this discussion, for many of the
factors which there lead to a reduction in charges would support an
entrapment defense.
A typical example of a case where the prosecutor will reduce a charge
due to anticipated difficulty of proof is where the informer-purchaser
has made the controlled buy completely out of sight of the police undercover agents. The State's Attorney must then put the informer-purchaser
94 See note 7

supra.

95 The result of more vigorous enforcement efforts.
96 This is a possible construction of the cases. In People v. Strong, 21 Ill. 2d 320,
324, 172 N.E.2d 765, 767 (1961), the court said "Itis true that the defense of entrapment
presupposed a criminal offense into which the defendant was enticed, and may be
therefore inconsistent with a claim of total innocence." People v. Van Scoyk, 21 Ill.
2d 232, 235, 170 N.E.2d 151, 152 (1960): "[D]efendant's complete denial of any mis" People v. Outten, 13
conduct is inconsistent with the defense of entrapment ....
Ill. 2d 21, 24, 147 N.E.2d 284, 286 (1958): "The defendant cannot here invoke this
defense in that, at the trial, he did neither admit the unauthorized sale of the heroin
to Smith, nor offer evidence io prove that he was lured .. " But see the new Illinois
Criminal Code, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 3-2 (1961) (Effective January 1, 1962).
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on the stand and this, it is felt, gives the defense an impeachable witness
as well as "burning out" the source of information. 97 In such a case the
prosecutor's reduction of charges to possession eliminates the facts which
might support the entrapment defense, since the informer-purchaser
would have induced the sale, not the possession.
More frequent are cases of the third type. Here four factors are operative in the prosecutor's decision to reduce charges:
(1) The type of narcotics (addicting or nonaddicting, usually a question of heroin or marijuana).
(2) The amount ("pure" or "padded," "bag" or "spoon").
(3) The type of violator (prior record, addict, nonaddict).
(4) Sale to whom (person posing or known to be an addict or someone
posing as a "chippy" (a novice or nontaker)).
For example, in a case of a controlled buy of two marijuana cigarettes
from a person with no prior record to a known forty-five year old addict
for three dollars, the defendant would receive a reduced charge from
sale to possession. 98 The absence of a prior record, which might lead to
a reduction of charges, would also be relevant to an entrapment defense.
So, too, would the role played by the undercover agent. The more
realistic the claimed need for narcotics on the part of the undercover
agent (as where he poses as a heavy user), the more likely it is that an
entrapment has taken place.
The prosecutors unanimously stated that the single reason which leads
to the reduction of charges where there is insufficient evidence or a
"letter-of-the-law" violation is the anticipated adverse response of the
judge to full prosecution. Although it was reported that the trial judges
will sometimes reduce the charge themselves-even though formally they
are bound by the crime charged in the indictment-the prosecutors stated
that they never counted on this and that their judgments were made
solely in view of the likelihood that the defendant would be acquitted
on a verdict of not guilty because of the harsh character of the sale
statute.
97

The author was told by both prosecutor and police: "You know, they [those

engaged in the narcotics trade for a living] have scouts around to see who has been
telling what. There are plenty of people in court who have no right to be there."
98 In the unreported case of People v. Galindo (Grim. No. 591433, Crim. Ct., Cook

County, Ill., 1959), the facts were as follows: An off-duty undercover agent, on leaving
a restaurant, observed a shiftless looking character of Latin appearance standing on a
street comer. On an admitted chance, he approached the "suspect" and asked if he
had any "stuff." The "suspect" called the officer over and sold him two marijuana
cigarettes for three dollars. Defendant ,was charged with the sale of narcotics. The

trial judge said that because the officer had no reason to suspect that the defendant
was engaged in illegal activity, he would hold that there was entrapment as to the
sale unless the prosecution agreed to reduce the charge, which was done.
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There is, however, an important factor leading to a reduction in
charge which is unrelated to the entrapment defense: Is the defendant
an addict or nonaddict? If he is shown to be a consumer of narcotics the
prosecutor feels that he sells only to sustain his own addiction (taking
the amount sold into consideration) and the charge will be reduced.
If he is not an addict the defendant is likely to be characterized as a
"nonaddict pusher" and the charge will not be reduced (although the
amount of the sale and to whom-for example, an undercover agent
posing as a nonuser-has a countervailing effect).
Of the factors warranting a reduction of charges in the "token" violation situation, two also support an entrapment defense: type of defendant (no prior record) and sale to whom (a known addict as opposed
to a novice). As a result the prosecutor's decision to reduce charges may
also operate as a silencer for arguably good claims of entrapment.
Finally, it must be noted that charges can no longer be reduced once
the drug is found to be a narcotic, as opposed to a barbituate, below the
two year minimum penalty of the possession statute. 99 Previously, reduction was often made to "state-addict" under the Illinois statute' 00 which
has been declared unconstitutional by the Illinois Supreme Court. 101
Several of the prosecutors stated that they felt that this fact may well
provide a stimulus, the impact of which is yet to be felt, for a revival of
the defense of entrapment.
I1. ADINIsTRATIvE RECOMMENDATIONS

A.

Police

There are five principal factors which account for the present safeguards against the precipitation of unconscionable police solicitation to
commit crime.
First is the basic background factor against which all others may be
placed: the definition of the focus of enforcement as the low-level streetpeddler. Although the many "real" cases necessitate constant recourse to
the device of police solicitation, they also obviate the possibility of concentration on single, selected "priority-targets."
Second is the municipal police perception of their role in the entire
narcotics enforcement picture. Since "operation crabgrass" does not go
beyond the street, it is unnecessary for the officers to attempt to penetrate
the "legitimate" front of the distribution hierarchy.
Next, the esprit of the "special" force working in "secret" police units
99 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 88, § 22-40 (1961).
100 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 22-3 (1961).

101 People v. Davis, 27 Il1.2d 57, 188 N.E.2d 225 (1963).
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has produced a remarkable ideal of honor and fairness in the officers'
day-to-day operations.
Finally, the same public pressures which demand that enfcrcement
efforts be made in the first place also demand that these efforts be
vindicated by ultimate conviction. Although the actual inducements
offered in the field are often the result of on the spot decision, the police
avoid strategies such as the offer to sell and the "split" which would immediately raise the entrapment issue. Officers who prove to be chronic
entrappers are likely to be transferred from the narcotics division.
Outside the administrative process there is one factor inherent in the
affirmative trap itself which discourages excessive inducements. Often
excessive inducements will jeopardize the trap by arousing the suspect's
suspicions. The criminal suspect is likely to be wary of the device in
view of its prevalent use and the skilled entrapper must tread a path
between inducements sufficient to arouse the target's interest and inducements which arouse his suspicion.
Not all of these factors are "built into" every system of narcotics enforcement. The natural suspicions of the suspect will always be present.
The pressure for convictions will be effective to protect against excesses
so long as the courts recognize the defense. But the focus of the enforcement program appears to be changing. Nighttime enforcement and the
"big-spender," both strategies under consideration by the Section, involve
a shift of attention from the small time consumer and supplier to the
chain of supply itself. Unquestionably the contemplated focus is desirable. In the normal distribution situation a demand must exist before
a supply is profitable. Therefore, it might be reasoned, if the demand
is eliminated so is the profit in supplying. But the narcotics supplier
is selling a commodity which, because of addiction, creates its own
demand. With this shift in the focus of enforcement efforts opportunities for abuse of the affirmative trap increase. Such an enforcement program would require: (1) Approaches to legitimate citizens
on the theory that they are only "legitimized"; (2) offers of substantially greater amounts of money for larger quantities of narcotics and
(3) focus on specific "priority-targets" who have been developed through
patient infiltration typically achieved by sustained association and the
10 2
establishment of ties of friendship.
The necessity for the frequent use of the device of the affirmative trap
is questionable. It is only because enforcement is focused on the "street
102

Infiltration can of course be used as the sole means of detection. Entrapment

is then unnecessary. See, e.g., the sustained efforts at surveillance and infiltration by
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics resulting in the case of United States v. Bentvena,
319 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1963); which involved thirteen defendants.
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offender" that widespread use of the device is necessary.' 03 The nature of
the physical situation in which street narcotics offenses are committed,
their attendant secrecy and unobtrusiveness, makes the affirmative trap
the only effective means of penetration. But even at this level the device
is inefficient. It was estimated that the average "controlled buy" required,
at the minimum, fifty-and more closely seventy-five-man hours to
engineer. The device is also inefficient in another sense. Insofar as it is
used only as a means of obtaining further information it falls short of a
policy of full prosecution.
Aside from inefficiency, the device involves two inherent dangers: first,
the danger of entrapment itself and second, the debilitating effect it may
have on law enforcement. Cases are not unknown where the informerpurchasers-necessary concomitants of the device-have introduced defendants to narcotics. 04 There is always the risk of persistent appeals
to sympathies of the highest order,10 5 or straight-forward "frame-ups."' 10 6
The primary reason for the careful "security" check of all the officers
in the Section is the constant opportunity presented to the officers,
working without supervision in the field, to exert malice, prejudice and
revenge towards their targets.
The question now is: Is there any method by which efficient total enforcement may be secured, the constant dangers minimized and safeguards strengthened.
Several specific administrative recommendations can be made:
(1) Increase efforts to achieve effective enforcement at all levels of the
distribution system.
(2) Promote night duty details.
(3) Require complete investigative reports.
(4) Employ at least one statistician.
103 See the special concurring opinion of Weigel, J. in Matysek v. United States,
321 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1963): "I am constrained to add that the facts in this case are
typical of an ugly pattern in so many arising under enforcement of narcotics laws
which fail to get at the main roots of the evil-addiction itself and huge profits to
large distributors preying upon it. Today we must affirm conviction of an addict-seller
driven to make small sales to obtain the means to satisfy his habit in which he is
enslaved. Tomorrow it will be an addict-buyer turned to a small seller for the same
reason. Today and tomorrow, following the law, we shall be forced to convict on the
basis of evidence obtained by enforcement officials using informers who are helpless
victims of the habit. In cases such as this, the law compels us, it seems to me, to become part of a process of futile nibbling at the outermost fringes of the real evils and
to condone methods of obtaining evidence which have no virtue save effectiveness."
104 E.g., People v. Silva, 180 F. Supp. 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). In Sherman v. United
States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958), the informer induced the defendant, who was under treatment for addiction, to return to the habit.
105 People v. Toler, 26 Ill. 2d 100, 185 N.E.2d 874 (1962).
106 People v. Strong, 21 Ill. 2d 320, 172 N.E.2d 765 (1961).
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(5) Require weekly exchanges of information with other narcotics law
enforcement officers.
(6) Insist that trading for information should occur only when:
a) The information leads directly to the arrest of a "superior"; or
b) To a "competitor" who immediately "flips" on a "superior."
(7) Informer-purchasers should be used only when they act under direct
police supervision at all times.
(8) Conduct a continuing evaluation of police policies relating to the
use of the affirmative trap including an evaluation of the necessity
of its use in the enforcement of narcotics laws and the "targets"
against which it is directed.
B.

Prosecutor

The main defect in administration in the State's Attorney's office is
insensitivity to the defense, due principally to five factors:
(1) The past relative infrequency of police conduct arguably qualifying as entrapment;
(2) The narrow scope of the defense as formulated in Illinois appellate
doctrine;
(3) The meager investigative reports;
(4) The routine nature of the cases, the homogeneity of the defendants,
the unvarying path which the cases follow, and the standardization
of the facts due to the unvarying use of the detection device itself;
and
(5) The prosecutor's conception of his job.
The factors which eliminate opportunities to recognize facts which
might justify the defense should be eliminated.
This is imperative. First, because notions of equal justice are aggravated by procedures which effectively silence legitimate claims. Secondly,
in view of the Criminal Code's requirement that the defense does not
admit the elements of the offense'0 7 and the proposed shift in enforcement policy to ostensibly legitimate members of the narcotics distribution system, the presently dormant defense may soon become a lively
issue at trial. Prosecutors who are not appraised of a possible defense may
be caught off guard.
It is recommended that:
(1) The prosecutor should receive investigative reports which disclose
fully the facts of the alleged offense.
(2) The prosecution of narcotics offenses should not be conducted on a
routine basis. Elimination of the special Narcotics Court should
107 See text page 149 supra and note 96 supra.
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be considered. Prosecutor assignments should be rotated more frequently.
(3) The State's Attorney's office should articulate standards for the
reduction of charges and prosecutors should be required to give
reasons for this action.
C.

The Courts
Field research shows that the principal impact which trial court practices have had on the defense derives from the rule that a claim of entrapment admits all the elements of the offense. This makes an assertion
of the defense a risk which defense counsel are seldom willing to take.
Since the defense of entrapment can be raised on appeal without having
been exclusively relied upon or pleaded at trial'0 s the first effective opportunity which the defendant has to assert an entrapment defense is in
the supreme court. Only in the final stage of the criminal process are
defense counsel free to urge the entrapment defense without hesitation.
The supreme court should seize upon the first opportunity presented to
make it dear to the trial courts that the new Criminal Code changes the
intimations of the court's earlier opinions that a claim of entrapment
admits the elements of the offense. 10 9 Once some evidence is presented
thereon, "the State must sustain the burden of proving the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as to that issue together with all other
elements of the offense.""10
IV.

DOCTRINAL CONCLUSIONS

The positions of both the majorities and minorities in Sorrells"' and
Sherman" 2 can be subjected to telling criticism.
To base the defense of entrapment in legislative intent is to conceal
under the guise of statutory interpretation a process of judicial law
making. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter noted in Sherman:
[T]he only legislative intention . .. that can . .. be extracted

from the statute is the intention to make criminal precisely the
3
conduct in which the defendant has engaged."
108 People v. Strong, 21 Ill. 2d 320, 324, 172 N.E.2d 765, 767 (1961): "The People
insist that the defense of entrapment was not raised during the trial and cannot
therefore be raised on appeal. This argument is not well taken, because facts suggesting entrapment were presented in detail and defense counsel raised the point in
his dosing argument. Entrapment need not be specially pleaded or relied upon
conclusively so long as it has been clearly suggested in the trial court."
109 See note 96 supra.
110 ILL. Rav.STAT. ch. 38, § 3-2(b) (1961). (Emphasis added.)
111 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
112 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
113 Id. at 379.
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The problem for the courts is not to divine legislative intent but to fill
out the legislative pattern by articulating general standards for the application of the defense in situations beyond the legislative view. But the
majority did not articulate standards of general application. Instead
they articulated a standard based on the particular proclivities of the
particular defendant. Their genesis of intent test is based on a misunderstanding of general principles of criminal liability and results in an
-unequal and unjustifiable treatment of the citizenry. It is clear that in
every instance of police solicitation, no matter how persuasive the inducement, the defendant intended in the only sense that the law requires
to commit the particular crime for which he is charged. The fact that the
defendant was induced by a government agent does not vitiate his intent
any more than if he were induced by a private citizen. That the intent
did not originate with the defendant does not make his intent any less
1 4
criminal. 1
Under the genesis of intent test, the defendant's prior convictions,
record of offenses for which he was not prosecuted or convicted and
reputation are admissible in evidence to show that he was "predisposed"
to commit the crime. But such evidence is not probative of the defendant's intent to commit the particular crime with which he is charged.
Because the defendant's prior record is considered relevant, the majority position allows the police to use greater inducements against those
who can be shown to have previously engaged in the criminal activity.
This cannot be justified by the reason for which we allow the police to
trap in the first instance: that some criminal activity is virtually impossible to detect without police participation in the offense. One who
is predisposed to commit the offense obviously does not require a greater
inducement than one who has a normal resistance to criminal temptations. The attempted justification for the use of extraordinary inducements against those who are shown to be "predisposed" rests on the
questionable inference that although the police have used inducements
strong enough to overcome the resistance of those who do not commit
crimes, the defendant would have succumbed to d lesser inducement since
he had the demonstrable predisposition to commit the crime. In other
words, that part of the inducement which was excessive by ordinary
standards is to be discounted because, it is said, the defendant would
have succumbed to a lesser one.
The prejudicial impact of the defendant's prior record and reputation
114 At least one court has recognized this anomaly in the genesis of intent theory.
People v. Benford, 53 Cal. 2d 1, 10, 345 P.2d 928, 934 (1959). See also Sherman v.
United States, 356 U.S. 369, 382 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). But where the
substantive definition of the crime requires a nonconsenting victim, no offense is
committed because the trapper encouraged the target. See discussion p. 142 supra.
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is felt not only in jury deliberations but also in appellate court decisions.
Ambiguities in the circumstances surrounding the crime tend to be consistently resolved against the defendant when they are wrenched out of
focus by evidence of his criminal record. The reluctance of the defendant
is seen as the natural reluctance of the criminal instead of the resistance
of the law abiding citizen. The delay in commission is attributed to the
stealth and secrecy of the criminal instead of to the difficulty which the
ordinary citizen might be expected to have in gaining access to criminal
means. Under the pervasive influence of a criminal record the very
factors which might lead to the acquittal of a first-offender are turned
against the defendant. 115
To allow the police to use stronger inducements against those who
have bad reputations "in effect . . permits the police to obtain a conviction of a once rehabilitated criminal whom they have badgered into
resumption of crime."" 06 Such practices are repugnant to our sense of
fairness and equality before the law. To permit this discrimination militates against "the whole ameliorative hopes of modern penology.""17 In
essence the genesis of intent test makes the weakness of the defendant a
crime in itself. A higher not a lower standard is demanded of those
least able to comply with the demands of the criminal law.
The minority position in Sorrells and Sherman is based on questionable assumptions about the role of the judiciary in the administration
of criminal justice. Although there is de facto legal authority for the
power of the federal courts to supervise the administration of criminal
justice,"18 it is ironic but true that the courts are not in the best possible
position to either protect their own integrity or insure adequate standards. A court's authority can only be felt after the fact of police excesses. Although the possibility of unsuccessful prosecutions is of concern
to the police, the excessive inducements which trigger the defense are
often made in spontaneous field situations. And in refusing to consider
the particular defendant's record the minority casts aside one factor
which normally might be thought relevant to objective standards of
police conduct. Within absolute limits are not the police justified 4n
115 Access to narcotics is not inconsistent with a claim of innocence among certain
social groups. "That he [defendant] was able to secure the drug is not in itself
startling. There are doubtlessly many people who live on the seamy side of life in the
great cities, innocent of association with crime and without criminal proclivities who,
,nevertheless, in their lives and experience about the streets have a pretty good idea
of where narcotics are to be obtained." Morei v. United States, 127 F.2d 827, 834 (6th
Cir. 1942).
116 People v. Benford, 53 Cal. 2d 1, 11 n.4, 345 P.2d 928, 935 nA (1959).
117 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 383 (1958).
I8 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
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concentrating their enforcement efforts against those who in the past
have shown a proclivity to commit crime?
In spite of the fact that it is possible to find fault with either position,
both the majority and minority were responsive to central considerations. In asking: "Should this defendant be put in jail?" the majority
attempted to articulate standards of criminal liability. In asking: "Did
the police conduct violate acceptable standards?" the minority attempted
to delineate the acceptable limits of the device. But in formulating general standards of criminal liability in terms of a subjective genesis of
intent test the majority went astray. Curiously their question might
have been better answered had they adopted the minority's objective
standard. The minority, by refusing to consider the prior record of the
defendant at all, turned its back on at least one factor which might be
considered relevant to police conduct. Their question might have been
better answered had they listened more sympathetically to the majority's
subjective standards. But even though the answers are not entirely satisfactory, the questions are helpful.
As has already been noted, general principles of criminal liability
demand that the victim of an affirmative trap be found guilty. Even
where there has been an entrapment the victim has committed all the
acts essential to the crime and with the requisite intent, namely, that
the forbidden act be done. Similarly the police officer who solicits the
offense is guilty. If a person solicits another to commit an offense he is
guilty of solicitation if the crime is not committed and as an accessory
or principal if it is committed. 119
But even though under general principles of criminal liability the
victim is guilty, it can be argued that to imprison such a defendant is
not consonant with the deterrent aims of the criminal law. The simplest
way to deter crime which is the result of police solicitation, it could be
argued, is to stop the police from soliciting. The state, having been the
cause of the criminal act, is hardly in a position to demand that the
victim should now be imprisoned in order to protect the state against
the commission of similar crimes. As in equity, the prosecution must have
clean hands before relief will be granted. Under this argument every
victim of police solicitation would have a good defense.
The acceptance of the device of the affirmative trap and recognition of
its concomitant limitation-the entrapment defense-is based on a compromise between these two positions. The device will be accepted so
long as its use can be shown to be necessary for effective enforcement of
the law. The state is permitted to solicit the crime in the particular case
119 Mikell, The Doctrine of Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 90 U. PA. L. REV.

245, 264 (1942). See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 5-2, 8-1 (1961).
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in the hope that the successful detection and prosecution will act to
deter future violations. Field research indicates that so long as it is
deemed necessary to apply criminal sanctions against consenting and
competent parties engaged in selling and buying narcotics, it will be
necessary to employ the device of the affirmative trap in order to detect
violators. But the use of the device as a detection measure can only be
justified on the basis of the unusual presumption that those who have
once committed crime with police solicitation have committed or will
commit similar crimes that escape police detection. Yet to abandon the
device is to render the narcotics laws nugatory. Dead letter statutes
should not be countenanced. The burden of this argument is not to
weigh the objections to the necessary enforcement measures against the
necessity of having the law, 120 but to determine what devices exceed the
necessities of enforcement and to provide safeguards against these abuses.
In summary, the use of the device is justified only where: (1) It is
necessary for effective enforcement and (2) it can properly be implied
from the conduct of the defendant that he has or would have committed
similar crimes.
The element of necessity involves two factors. First, is the use of the
device necessary in order to enforce the particular law involved? Second,
was it necessary to use the affirmative trap device against the particular
defendant? The first, it is submitted, is not a question suitable for
judicial cognizance. Its solution turns on difficult choices between numerous possible police strategies for enforcement of the law. A decision
to use the affirmative trap as a detection measure must rest upon a full
appreciation of the day-to-day workings and limitations of crime detection. The frequency of the crime and its threat to the community must
be evaluated and the difficulty of using other methods of detection
weighed. This is a decision best left to the police administrative process.
The justification for using the device against the particular defendant,
however, is a different matter. If the police had no reasonable cause to
suspect that the defendant was participating in a continuing course of
criminal conduct it is difficult to relate such "shot in the dark" traps
to any rational program of enforcement. There is no reason to allow the
police, without antecedent justification, to add to the temptations to
crime which exist independently in society. Spot traps represent a heavy
commitment of police resources with little likelihood of success. In the
absence of a reasonable cause requirement affirmative traps motivated
by police vindictiveness are condoned. A reasonable cause requirement
has traditionally been considered suitable for judicial determination.
The fact that reasonable cause requirements are more often associated
120

But see Solomon, Book Review, 30 U.

CHI.

L. REV. 794 (1963).
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with rights of constitutional origin should not preclude its application
to the nonconstitutional right "not to be entrapped."' 121 Field research
has shown that the police administrative decision most readily subject
to control is not the decision as to what inducements should be offered
-often made in a spontaneous field situation-but whether to lay the
affirmative trap at all. A reasonable cause requirement provides the
courts with an effective test for supervising police conduct and turns
on a concept which they are competent to handle.
The issue of reasonable cause should be tried to the judge, not the
jury. The defendant's criminal record should not be allowed to infect
the jury's deliberations. Because of their day-to-day familiarity with the
criminal process trial judges are in a better position than jurors to
evaluate police conduct. Articulated judicial decisions would give the
police more effective guidelines to future conduct than would jury determinations immersed in the ambiguous mass of a general verdict.
The second important factor necessary to justify the use of the device
-whether or not it can properly be implied from the conduct of the
defendant that he has or would have committed similar crimes-turns
on the nature of the inducements offered. If the defendant yielded to
inducements which would have caused an ordinary citizen to commit
the crime, then it is difficult to infer that he would have committed the
crime without the inducements. Presumably, ordinary citizens do not
normally commit crime. If the inducements offered by the police exceed
the level of susceptibility of the ordinary citizen then the device is ineffective as a detection measure. A test responsive to these considerations is contained in the Model Penal Code. 122 The thrust of the Model
121 In Whiting v. United States, 321 F.2d 72 (1st Cir. 1963), the defendant contended
that a controlled buy without "prior good reason to suspect guilt" was entrapment
per se. "We do not agree. Solicitation to commit a crime does not of itself involve
constitutional rights and is not comparable to the arrest of person or to the invasion
of premises." Id. at 76. The source of the right not to be entrapped-whether constitutional, legislative or judicial-should be treated as unrelated to the question of
its proper scope.
122 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(1)(b) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962): "A public law

enforcement official or a person acting in cooperation with such an official perpetrates
an entrapment if for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the commission of an
offense, he induces or encourages another person to engage in conduct constituting
such offense by . . . employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a
substantial risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other than those
who are ready to commit it." The central concept in the code test is "persons ready
to commit it" rather than "ordinary citizen." This leads the drafters into difficulty.
Even a man of marked criminal proclivities is probably not "ready" to commit a
crime of violence while an ordinary citizen, on the other hand, could probably never
be induced to commit a crime of violence. As a result the drafters provided in
§ 2.13(3): "The defense afforded by this Section is unavailable when causing or
threatening bodily injury is an element of the offense charged and the prosecution is

based on conduct causing or threatening such injury to a person other than the person

1963]

DEVICE AND DEFENSE

Penal Code test, in the eyes of the drafters and of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, from whose concurring opinion in Sherman it was largely taken,
is in controlling police conduct. But field research has shown that the
controllable police decision is whether or not to entrap at all. The
actual inducements offered often turn on split second judgments made
in field situations. The test is necessary because if the inducements offered exceed the susceptibility of the ordinary citizen-defined in part
as a person who is not ready to commit crime-then the defendant's
acquiescence does not mark him as criminal. Needless to say, such a test
would encourage the police-under pressure to obtain at least an adequate quota of convictions-to use inducements which will permit conviction. But the situation surrounding the affirmative trap is often a
more effective protection against excessive inducements. To succeed in
trapping a suspect the police must be careful not to arouse suspicion.
Excessive inducements are themselves the best way to put a suspect on
guard that there is something unusual about the transaction. While
many strategies-such as an offer to sell instead of to buy-raise the
excessive inducement problem without creating suspicion, more often
than not caution is necessary for police success. The test is, of course, important in delineating the permissible range of police conduct. But its
even greater significance is in response to the question: Is this defendant
criminal?
The "ordinary man" standard, turning on a judgment about the
response of men not "ready" to commit crime to police inducements, is
a suitable issue for jury determination. It presents an issue properly, if
perpetrating the entrapment." The reason given for this section is that "a person who
can be persuaded to cause such injury presents a danger that the public cannot safely
disregard." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10, comment 7 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). But if the
police have in fact offered inducements which create a substantial risk that an ordinary
citizen would commit the crime, then it would appear that the police, not their target,
present "a danger that the public cannot safely disregard." If the jury finds that the
inducements offered created a substantial risk that an ordinary citizen would have
committed the crime then there is no reason to infer that the defendant will commit
or has committed similar offenses--even if the crime induced caused or threatened
bodily injury to a third person. The police, rather than the defendant, having created
such a risk should be held responsible for it.
The Model Penal Code supplies an additional test. Section 2.13(i)(a) provides for
exculpation when the officer induces the defendant to commit the crime by "making
knowingly false representations designed to induce the belief that such conduct is not
prohibited." It is submitted that this test is actually only one aspect of the substantial
risk test. One way in which a public law enforcement official can induce a citizen to
commit a crime is to convince him that the acts induced are not criminal. But it
would be perfectly natural for an agent in his undercover role to make some remark
to the effect that "it isn't really criminal to sell narcotics." This should not vitiate the
trap. If the officer relies upon his badge of authority, however, to convince the target
that the acts are not criminal then the "ordinary citizen" test has probably been
satisfied.
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not constitutionally, within the province of the jury: the guilt of the
defendant.
The criminal liability of the police officer or his agent carrying out an
affirmative trap has been largely ignored. One writer has suggested that
the answer to the whole entrapment problem is to prosecute the entrapping officer. 123 Although under present law the officer may very well be
criminally liable not only when he entraps, but when he simply traps,
a suspect, 124 there is little reason to think that prosecutions of the
police will ever occur in view of the close association between the
prosecutor's office and the police. 125 Hand in hand with a consideration of
the entrapment defense must go consideration of the permissible scope
of the now implicit state solicitation defense. 126 Continuing dead letter
violations of the law by the police can hardly be expected to foster a high
respect for the law on their part. Yet the police are the very group
entrusted with the high responsibility of front line law enforcement.
Although an interlaced reading of the Illinois solicitation, narcotics
and entrapment sections might result in a principle of justification for
an officer or agent-informer who traps a suspect, it is impossible to infer
a defense for an officer who oversteps the limits of the entrapment
defense. The defense of the officer or his agent-informer should not turn
on the inducements offered. Once authorized by the state to trap, it
seems undesirable to put him in jail because he has, in a sense, done his
job too well. Administrative transfers or suspensions combined with a
loss of the conviction are the proper way to handle such overzealousness.
But police officers who initiate traps on the basis of personal whim or to
carry out personal vendettas, or informers who initiate traps simultaneously to placate the police and "get" an enemy, without reasonable
grounds of suspicion, should be subject to criminal penalties. The first
line of deterrence would be the "reasonable cause" standard of the
entrapment defense itself. But an officer should not be made criminally
liable because he misjudged the existence of reasonable cause. The
123 Mikell, supra note 119, at 264: "A few such convictions and the practice of entrapment would cease."
124 Since there is no explicit defense in the Illinois Criminal Code. But the reported
cases attune the criminal liability of the trapper to whether or not there was entrapment. Reigan v. People, 120 Colo. 472, 210 P.2d 991 (1949); Wilson v. People, 103
Colo. 441, 87 P.2d 5 (1939); State v. Bigley, 53 Idaho 636, 26 P.2d 375 (1933); State v.
Torphy, 78 Mo. App. 206 (1899). Cf. Lilly v. West Virginia, 29 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1928),
holding that police pursuing criminals are exempt from traffic regulations.
125 MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.10, comment I n.2 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959): "There is
little reason to suppose that prosecutors would move against the police save in the
most extreme cases." Cf. Comment, Private Prosecution: A Remedy for District Attorney's UnwarrantedInaction, 65 YALE L.J. 209 (1955).
126 See notes 90, 124 supra.
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standard for the criminal liability of an officer and his agent-informer
should be the lesser one of reasonable suspicion. An officer or agentinformer who initiates a trap without a reasonable suspicion that the
target has engaged in similar criminal conduct can only be acting from
personal motives and his activity has no relationship to the law enforcement objectives of the state.
The present Illinois rule which puts the burden of proof on the
prosecution to prove the absence of entrapment beyond a reasonable
doubt once some evidence has been introduced thereon should be continued. The Model Penal Code places the burden on the defendant to
show "by a preponderance of evidence that his conduct occurred in
response to an entrapment."' 27 The reason given is that
[T]he defense of entrapment does not negative an element of
the crime .... The defense does not assert that the defendant

has not engaged in criminal activity nor does it truly seek to
excuse or justify a criminal act. The defense is, in fact, a complaint by the accused against the state for employing a certain
kind of unsavory enforcement. The accused is asking to be relieved of the consequences of his guilt by objecting to police
tactics. He is a plaintiff and should be required to come forward
with the evidence and to establish the main elements of his
claim by a preponderance of proof.

128

The answer to the above argument is that the substantial risk test
not only serves to define the proper scope of police conduct but is
also responsive to the question of whether the defendant's conduct
justifies the application of criminal sanctions. But it is more meaningful to discuss the burden of proof standard in terms of the effect
it will have on the substantive reach of the defense. In most of the
cases the entrapment issue at trial turns, if raised, on a battle of credibility between an informer-agent and the defendant. If any burden
of proof is placed on the defendant he will have to take the stand to
rebut the testimony of the agent-informer. His past criminal record will
then come in for purposes of impeachment. On the other hand, if the
burden of proof is on the state the defense can attack the credibility of
the agent-informer by means of his past criminal record and by exploring
his relationships with the police. Because of the prevailing jury attitude
towards narcotics offenders and the "caught him in the act" nature of
cases made by means of an affirmative trap the usually indigent narcotics
defendant is faced with a difficult burden. To put the burden of proof
on him to show by a preponderance of evidence that he was entrapped
127 MODEL PENAL CODE

128 MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 2.13(2) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
§ 2.10 comment 4 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
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is practically to eliminate the defense. Criticism of the genesis of intent
test because it turns in part on the criminal record of the defendant is
not theoretically inconsistent with an allocation of the burden of proof
which forces the defendant to take the stand and make his record admissible for purposes of impeachment. But in either case the jury learns
of the defendant's criminal record with its presumably prejudicial impact. Putting the burden of proof on the state encourages the police to
use strategies where the transaction occurs within the view of the undercover agent because an officer is not as easy to impeach as an agentinformer. This would serve to decrease the possibility of entrapment by
a desperate, unsupervised informer eager to escape a jail sentence.
V.

PROPOSED LEGISLATION

The following statute is submitted as the most reasonable formulation

of the principles and findings which have been the burden of this paper.
Entrapment
(1) A person prosecuted for an offense shall be acquitted if a public
law enforcement official or a person acting in co-operation with such
official for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the commission of such
offense

(a) induces the commission of such offense by employing methods of
persuasion which create a substantial risk that such offense will be
committed by an ordinary citizen; or

(b) solicits the commission of such offense without reasonable cause
to believe that such person has committed or will commit it.
(2) The issue in clause (1)(a) shall be tried by the jury. The issue in
clause (1)(b) by the judge.
129
(3) Entrapment is an affirmative defense.

(1) A public law
with such official
criminal offense
of an offense by

State Solicitation
enforcement official or a person acting in co-operation
shall be acquitted of the crime of solicitation or of any
committed in the course of inducing the commission
another for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the

commission of the offense unless he solicits the commission of such

offense
(a) without a reasonable suspicion that such person has committed
or will commit it; or
129 As defined in the Illinois Criminal Code. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 3-2 (1961).
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(b) in such a manner as to endanger the person or property of a third
person. 30
131
(2) State solicitation is an affirmative defense.

130 Sanction of the affirmative trap results from a delicate balance between the
social interest in effective enforcement and the undesirability of police solicitation of
criminal acts. When the interests of a third person are added to the formula the
scales are thrown towards non-recognition of the device. See discussion note 122 supra.
131 There are no compelling arguments for making the defense affirmative. It is
made affirmative here in accordance with the general scheme of the Illinois Criminal
Code.

